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THE AMERICANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
over certainty and judicial enforceability. Al-
though he concludes that the ultimate effective-
ness of nonbinding norms is still uncertain, Kiss,
too-like most of the other contributors-defends
their widespread use as tools in the increasingly
complicated tasks of norm setting and standard
setting for the world community.
The final chapter of Commitment and Compli-
ance-Edith Brown Weiss's "Understanding Com-
pliance with Soft Law"-begins by stressing the
need to categorize instruments, both binding
and nonbinding in their form and content, in
light of the purposes to be served. This categori-
zation would serve, in turn, as a means of gaining
a better, more sophisticated understanding of
patterns of compliance and noncompliance. (As
an application of this kind of "functionalist
theory," the present reviewer's own taxonomic
work on negotiated instruments has since been
published.") But the further development of
functionalist taxonomies is only one of several
tasks that need to be addressed by an equivalent
group of scholars working along the cross-disci-
plinary, multisectoral, and transgenerational
lines of the present volume and its seminal proj-
ect. Because of the fundamental and global im-
plications of such scholarship, it is surely impor-
tant to move to the next stage by involving more
scholars from non-Western cultures. Moreover,
the challenge to legal orthodoxy inherent in this
kind of scholarship seems to call for a richer
blend of social and behavioral scientists-in
addition to lawyers and political scientists. And
the growing importance of nonstate institutions
in the promotion, negotiation, interpretation,
monitoring, and application of transnational
commitments-not only by nongovernmental
institutions, but by corporations, as documented
by many of the volume's authors-makes it
essential to involve a larger number of non-
academic participants and observers in future
projects of this collaborative sort. Indeed, it
might be suggested that the "infinite variety" of
international law2 reflected in the ever increas-
ing diversity of negotiated instruments" would
be best explored through the development of a
new cross-disciplinaryfield of studies designed to
encompass all facets of these phenomena: the
making and maintenance of treaty commitments,
or "treaty studies."
2 Johnston, supra note 8. [Editor's note: The book
is reviewed by Robert E. Dalton, 94 AJIL 204 (2000).]2
' Richard R. Baxter, InternationalLaw in 'HerInfinite
Variety,' 29 INT'L & COM. L.Q. 549 (1980).
nAnthonyAust, The TheoryandPracticeofInformallnter-
nationallnstruments, 35 INT'L& CoMp. L.Q. 787 (1986).
In the meantime, the ASIL is to be congratu-
lated for bringing together such a stellar panel of
scholars for this significant venture. With the
nucleus in place, perhaps the first step has now
been taken toward the assembly of a larger
scholarly community interested in contributing
to the development of a new and much needed
field of study.
DOUGLAS M.JOHNSTON
Faculty of Law (Emeritus)
University of Victoria, Canada
The Law of Peoples. By John Rawls. Cambridge,
London: Harvard University Press, 1999. Pp.
viii, 199. Index. $23.95, £16.50, cloth; $16.95,
£11.50, paper.
John Rawls, arguably the most important politi-
cal philosopher writing in the last half century,
contends in The Law of Peoples that many widely
accepted principles of international law coexist
easily with a distinctively liberal conception of
right and wrong governmental action in inter-
national settings. He suggests that, for states
organized in light of liberal premises, their do-
mestic constitutions and modes of public dis-
course oblige, in effect, adherence to a range of
international norms. Other states, because they
reflect "decent hierarchical" assumptions, are
similarly constrained. Rawls also argues that "out-
law states"-states not meeting his definitions of
"liberal" or "decent"-may be properly subject to
international sanctions for their entirely domes-
tic misconduct. War against "outlaw states" may
well be just; war against "liberal" or "decent' states
cannot be. States in which liberal developments
are frustrated by adverse economic circum-
stances are owed a "duty of assistance."'
The Law of Peoples might someday be grouped
with writings of Grotius and Kant.' This review is
not the place to explore that possibility? Rawls
'Along the way, illustrating his analysis, Rawls inter-
jects sharp comments on a surprisingly ide range of
topics; for example, conventional and atomic bombing
of cities by the United States and Great Britain in World
War II, the terms within which the Holocaust is relevant
for international political theory, and the role of reli-
gion in the governments of Islamic-majority populations.
2 See RicHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTs OFWARAND PEACE:
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
FROM GROTIUS TO KANT (1999).
' For discussions of The Law of Peoples from the per-
spective of present-day political philosophy, see Charles
Beitz, Rawls' Law of Peoples, 110 ETHICS 669 (2000);
Allen Buchanan, Rawls'Law of Peoples: Rules for a Van-
ished Westphalian World, 110 ETHICS 697 (2000);
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draws upon a vocabulary that, initially anyway, is
not especially technical; but he puts seemingly
common terms to use in notably dense and intri-
cate ways. The impact of The Law of Peoples out-
side the precincts of political philosophy will
depend, to a large extent, upon whether readers
find this process of analytical elaboration persua-
sive. Students of international law, in particular,
should regard the Rawlsian analysis as at least
provocative. It deploys a strikingly limited con-
ception of international law, seemingly grudging
in its account of international human rights and
international organizations, but shows that con-
ception to possess surprising and strong origins.
I will suggest at the close of this review that it is
relatively easy to fit additional international law
nearby (as it were) the international law norms
that Rawls singles out, and in the process buttress
Rawls's own construction, as well.
The book has two large parts: "The Law of
Peoples" and "The Idea of Public Reason Revis-
ited."4 The first part itself repeatedly subdivides.
Rawls begins with "Ideal Theory," considering
only relations as among liberal peoples and
governments; he then extends discussion to
cover nonliberal, "decent hierarchical" peoples
and governments. He next explores "Nonideal
Theory," discussing, inter alia, the requirements
for just war and the obligations that liberal and
decent hierarchical states owe "burdened socie-
ties." The discussion of public reason in the
second large part of the book is complementary.
It generalizes, explores further, and defends key
presuppositions of the argument of the firstpart.
But it does not add new matter particular to the
discussion of international norms.
The overall organization of The Law of Peoples
is illustrative of the book's form of argument
throughout-a cumulating claim, built up from
a sequence of observations and simplified ac-
counts. At times, sometimes at length, Rawis
presents a course in "moral learning," an effort
to show that persons living in both "liberal and
decent societies" will "accept willingly and ... act
upon" international legal norms (p. 44). These
norms, he thinks, will therefore be stable "for the
right reasons," consistent with "reasonable inter-
ests," and more secure than any merely realistic
Andrew Kuper, Rawlsian GlobalJustic4 28 POLITICAL
THEORY 640 (2000).
4 The first part elaborates and reworks an earlier
essay, seeJohn Rawls, The Law ofPeoples, in ON HuiAN
RIGHTs: THE OxFoRD AMNESy LECTURES (Stephen
Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993). The second part
reproduces an article Rawls had also previously pub-
lished. SeeJohn Rawls, The Idea ofPublic Reason Revisited,
64 U. Cm. L. REV. 765 (1997).
"modus vivendi, a stable balance of forces only for
the time being" (p. 45). This educational exer-
cise augments the analytical construction that is
the distinctive contribution of The Law of Peoples
(the reason why support is needed will become
apparent later). Two devices, in particular, are
prominent parts of this construction.
The first is suggested by the book's title. Rawls
distinguishes between governments of states and
the populations residentwithin state boundaries.
He contends that populaions--"peoples"-and
not governments should be treated as fundamen-
tal entities. But this assertion is carefully limited.
Rawls does not espouse any strong notion of
"nationality"--that is, treat particular peoples as
in some single important respect homogenous.
He supposes not only that state boundaries are
arbitrary, but that individuals within borders may
be diverse in all kinds of ways-religiously, eth-
nically, ideologically, and so on. Rawls believes,
even so, that governments may be meaningfully
categorized on the basis of how they ordinarily
deal with resident populations (which is what he
means, methodologically, by the priority of
peoples versus governments).
Liberal states are those that treat resident pop-
ulations as liberal peoples-as populations of
equally worthy individuals. Such states also treat
the well-being of the population in general as the
ultimate preoccupation of government; identify
some set of individual interests shared by all (or
almost all) residents as open only to limited gov-
ernmental regulation; and tie identification of
ultimately responsible government officers to
some direct or indirect process of popular selec-
tion. Other states are decently hierarchical. They
treat residents as essentially differentiated-to be
given greater or lesser priority in cases of con-
flicting interests-but still treat the interests of
residents, however ranked, as the ultimate pre-
occupation of government, and also seek to
identify those interests through some process of
consultation. Even if a majority population ad-
heres to religious beliefs with strong political
implications-here, Rawls treats Islam as para-
digmatic-the government possesses enough of
a separate identity to be able to frame its policies
in secular terms.
For Rawls, these categories are notjust descrip-
tive, but decisively normative. They suggest a
principle of self-censorship akin to the "original
position" and "veil of ignorance" famously put to
work in his 1971 book, A Theory ofJustice. Govern-
ments that adopt liberal or decent hierarchical
approaches may assert only those interests that
2001]
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derive from the well-being of their peoples as
modeled in the one way or the other States are
not understood differently in international and
domestic perspectives. Governmental interests
unrelated to peoples-such as the interests of
governments in their own prestige vis A vis other
governments-are irrelevant across the board.
This view of governmental interests does not
imply, though, that for Rawls all the different
interests that populations possess are, in fact,
equally pertinent. Nominally liberal or decently
hierarchical populations might be notably wolf-
ish at times-caught up in jingoist claims to
empire, in la gloire or ideas of manifest destiny,
or in racial or religious hatred. But these inclina-
tions are irrelevant from the perspective of
peoples considered as liberal or decently hierar-
chical.6 The only underlying common interests
of peoples are their shared commitments to lib-
erality or decent hierarchy.
These agenda restrictions make it possible for
Rawls, at least in dealing with liberal and decent
hierarchical peoples and states, to characterize
some disputes as effectively false conflicts, as
implicating no legitimate substantive issues. In
such cases, the interests that governments may
rightly seek to advance, he is able to argue, are
sufficiently restricted that one government can
frame no arguments against the acts of another
government that count (within the Rawlsian
system) as objections. Not all conflicts are false,
however. Acts of one government might ad-
versely affect at least some interests of some of
the peoples represented by other governments,
even in instances in which the acting govern-
ment is ostensibly addressing only the needs of
(some of) its own population. The possibility of
dispute remains even within the liberal or decent
perspective that The Law of Peoples adopts.
Rawls deploys a second device-a revised ver-
sion of the familiar idea of reciprocity-that
provides a way tojudge the importance of actual
conflicts between states. "[I] n proposing a princi-
ple to regulate the mutual relations between
peoples, a people or their representatives must
think not only that it is reasonable for them to
propose it, but also that it is reasonable for other
peoples to accept it" (p. 57). Proposals meet this
requirement if they "ask[] of other societies only
what they can reasonably grant without submit-
5 See also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MoRALrry OF FREEDOM
38-69 (1986).
6 Point of view-the possibility of differences in
point ofview-is thus a foundational premise for Rawls.
ting to a position of inferiority or domination"
(p. 121). Liberal or decent governments, in
other words, could properly agree to (or other-
wise accept) acts of other states because they
would have no grounds for objecting if the
organization of government and people-the
only concern, Rawls posits, that each government
understands other governments as necessarily
possessing-is not put at risk. Governments
would plainly have grounds, however, to protest
acts that threaten constitutional integrity.
Two corollaries, I think, follow. First, because
all governments involved could accept adverse
acts that meet the Rawlsian test, "tit for tat"
arrangements would be utterly noncontroversial.
Rawls does not proclaim the end of international
politics. Second, the idea of reciprocity, on this
account anyway, acquires at least some of its
persuasiveness from assumptions about the usual
magnitude ofeffects and the duration of relevant
time periods. Adverse effects produced by one
government are not likely to threaten the liberal
or decently hierarchical organization of a second
government and population if the effects are not
in themselves so dramatic or if, over a relevant
period of time, they will likely be offset.
The Law of Peoples thus supplies an explanation
for "It]he absence of war between major estab-
lished democracies"--which Rawls describes as
being "as close as anything we know to a simple
empirical regularity in relations among societies"
(pp. 52-53).' The point of war is to force "sub-
mission"; its initiation cannot, therefore, be de-
fended in terms acknowledging the norm of
reciprocity. But Rawls means to do more. Taken
together, his two central notions here-the pri-
ority of peoples and requirement of reciproc-
ity-organize a distinctive account of public rea-
son. Within its terms, liberal or decent hierarchi-
cal peoples and governments have no reason not
to accept familiar principles of international
law-principles that Rawls readily translates,
moreover, into terms consistent with his empha-
sis on peoples as primary and governments as
secondary. He refers, in particular, to the free-
dom and independence of peoples; their obliga-
tion to adhere to treaties and other undertak-
ings; the relative equality of peoples and their
status as parties to binding agreements; their
duty of nonintervention; their right of self-de-
fense; their obligation to honor human rights;
their obligation to restrict their conduct in war-
7 The now-classic statement of these propositions is
Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Af-
fairs &II, 12 PHIL. &PUB.AFF. 205 & 323 (1983).
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time; and their duty to assist other peoples living
in unfavorable circumstances (Rawls sees this last
duty to be the most controversial item on the
list). Notably, within this account, international
law figures as unobjectionable rather than as
affirmatively justified. Usual international law is
fallout, its acknowledgement a product of the
straitenings of Rawlsian public reason. Equally
notably, it is domestic constitutional arrange-
ments that do the restrictive work, that constrain
states to acquiescence in, and therefore contrib-
ute to, the persistence of international law.
The consequences of this approach are espe-
cially dramatic for analysis of the law of war,
international human rights, and any interna-
tional duty of assistance. The Law of Peoples at
times relies upon the sympathies of liberal and
decent peoples for other peoples. For govern-
ments that take their cues from popular con-
cerns, such fellow feeling is pertinent. But there
is also a strong "reason of state" line of argu-
ment. There are, for Rawls, no reasons that lib-
eral or decent hierarchical states can assert that
wouldjustify war with each other. Other states-
within his terms, "outlaws"-might not suffi-
ciently limit their governmental agendas and
might therefore pursue courses of action too ex-
treme to be brought within the assumptions of
reciprocity. Liberal or decent hierarchical gov-
ernments could properly act to counter outlaw
ambitions-even to the point of waging (mor-
ally) just defensive wars. The conduct of these
wars, Rawls thinks, should remain as true as
possible to the organizing premises of the prose-
cuting governments, and thus should respect the
basic distinction between governments and peo-
ples. He believes that outlaw regimes-he ex-
plores in some detail the "demonic" case of the
Nazi perpetrators of the Holocaust-do not
ordinarily represent a sufficiently independent
popular will to justify equation of states and
peoples. Acts of war should aim first at outlaw
governments themselves, next at their military
forces, last of all at civilian populations, and then
only if the populations in particular instances
have plainly aligned themselves with their gover-
nors. This hierarchy provokes the book's sharply
critical account of the firebombing of Dresden
and Tokyo, and of the atomic destruction of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in the final phase of
World War I. Rawls believes that, at that stage
especially, German andJapanese peoples could
not have been equated with their leaders.
International human rights are depicted in The
Law of Peoples as including only a skeletal subset
of the individual rights ordinarily acknowledged
by liberal states. "Human ights ... express a
special class of urgent rights, such as freedom
from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal
liberty) of conscience, and security of ethnic
groups from mass murder and genocide" (p. 79).'
These rights "set a necessary... standard for the
decency of domestic political and social institu-
tions" (p. 80). Limiting the set of international
human rights is, in part, necessary in order to
group together liberal and decent hierarchical
peoples and governments; Rawls cannot, for
example, recognize an international right to
democracy.9 But this limitation in the scope of
human rights is also a corollary of the idea of
reciprocity: liberal and decent governments may
properly respond only to acts that put at risk
their own liberal or decent constitutions. Inter-
national human rights are not therefore irrele-
vant, however, within the Rawlsian scheme. Acts
of a government, in dealing with its own people,
promise danger for other states if those acts
amount to infringements of "urgent rights." That
is, since for Rawls the only international human
rights are those that derive from the premises of
liberal or decent domestic constitutional ar-
rangements, a government's failure to treat
people within its borders in keeping with inter-
national human rights (as he defines them) is a
hallmark of an outlaw regime and is also a threat
to-and a once-removed act of aggression
against-liberal or decent hierarchical peoples
within the borders of other states. Outlaw gov-
ernments, in dealing with their own peoples,
signal what other states might expect. "Outlaw
states are aggressive and dangerous; all people
are safer and more secure if such states change,
or are forced to change, their ways" (p. 81).
Sanctioning such states for their domestic hu-
' Rawls also presents a fuller list, but again empha-
sizes limits:
Among the human rights are the right to life (to
the means of subsistence and security); to liberty
(to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced
occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty
of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and
thought); to property (personal property); and to
formal equality as expressed by the rules of natu-
ral justice (that is, that similar cases be treated
similarly). (P. 65, footnotes omitted)
9 For discussion of such a right, see THOMAS M.
FRANc, THE EMPOWERED SELF 263-75 (1999).
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man rights abuses is therefore akin to just war;
indeed, Rawls acknowledges the possibility that
domestic human rights abuses could warrant use
of force against an offending government.
A similar analysis underlies the duty of assis-
tance that Rawls describes. "A government's al-
lowing people to starve when it is preventable
reflects a lack of concern for human rights, and
well-ordered regimes ... will not allow this to
happen" (p. 109). Even in the absence of deeply
felt concern for the fate of other peoples, liberal
and decent states might properly prefer a world
in which there were more states of their own
kind: recognition of reciprocity would become
routine, and the need to anticipate extreme con-
duct would diminish. Aid to governments and
peoples blocked by economic or other address-
able circumstances becomes prudent defensive
policy-just like punitive responses to domestic
human rights violations.
The analysis that Rawls sets forth is, I think,
obviously vulnerable in at least one important
respect. A large part of a population might adopt
a strongly systematic (Rawls uses the term "com-
prehensive") view of their own well-being and
therefore understand seemingly separate matters
as interconnected parts. If so, a representative
government-either liberal or decent-might
feel obligated to proceed on the same assump-
tion. Specific acts of other governments could
therefore appear to possess a larger significance,
to threaten general popular commitments, and,
accordingly, to loom disproportionately large,
notwithstanding the mitigating effect of the
principle of reciprocity. Rawls, of course, is well
aware of this risk. He argues that at least in the
case of liberal peoples and governments, the
social and political arrangements generate their
own sensibility, one that values tolerance of dis-
agreement and that also reduces the appeal of
"all or nothing" agendas. Religious concerns-
which are, for Rawls, the paradigmatic source of
systematic unease-may at least sometimes be
addressed, albeit obliquely, in terms that are also
part of secular political vocabularies. Conse-
quently, governments that act in conformitywith
secular norms-such as reciprocity-may be able
to portray their conduct as religiously unprovoca-
tive. It is this possibility that Rawls underscores
both in his discussion in the latter part of the
book of the relationship of religion and public
reason in liberal societies, and in his construc-
tion of the model of the decent hierarchical state
(notably, he depicts its exemplar as Islamic).
Although The Law of Peoples does not much
discuss the possibility, there are obviously other
system builders besides religion. Nationalism, in
Benedict Anderson's famous phrase, generates
"imagined communities."" Sometimes, the re-
lated notions of race, ethnicity, or gender work
similarly-even, potentially, across state bound-
aries. There are, we all also know, economic sys-
tems. Perhaps the "specter of Communism" has
receded into the past. But participants in con-
temporary international market economies, for
example, may also proceed on the basis ofmodes
of thought that aggregate individual transactions
and that lead the participants tojudge the results
and consequently to develop larger agendas-
seeking various forms of distributive justice, for
example. States may find it difficult not to take
seriously such agendas, and thus governments
may become implicated in the conflicts between
market "winners and losers." Environmental,
ecological, and public health concerns argnably
prompt an analogous politics.
Systematic agendas could conceivably over-
whelm liberal, decent arrangements of the sort
that Rawls depicts-but this Armageddon, at least,
is not a likely prospect at present. The more
interesting question concerns the consequences
for The Law of Peoples of a kind of punctuation-
the possibility that liberal or decent hierarchical
peoples and states either will sometimes act as
prompted by systematic concerns or other stim-
uli difficult to defend in liberal or decent terms,
or will confront other states that are (for the mo-
ment, at least) little constrained by liberal or
decent reciprocity. Rawls is, of course, aware of
this possibility," He tends to focus his own atten-
tion, however, on extreme departures from
liberal and decentinternational order. Consider-
ation of Nazi Germany and discussions of right
responses to true outlaw states do not, itseems to
me, come to grips with the likely more frequent
problem. Ifoccasional departures from liberal or
decent norms of reciprocity by themselvesjustify
hostile action-action that in the circumstances
may not always be perceived as tit for tat-The
Law of Peoples would appear to authorize a sur-
prisingly edgy, tumultuous international politics.
10 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNIIES:
REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONAL-
ISM 5-7 (rev. ed. 1991).
" His sense of the requirements of a liberal state, in
particular, is at times quite rigorous. Arguably, the
United States does not pass muster (see pp. 48-51).
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Rawls relies on "statesmen" to manage problems
like this last one. But it is also possible, I think, to
frame a more general response. A better result
might obtain if states adopted a quantitative
version of the principle of interpretive charity (as
they probably already do). It may be that, on
occasion, momentarily systematic states act in
ways that, even if not likely to be soon repeated,
cannot be interpreted as other than unequivocal
acts of war. But hostile, systematically prompted,
one-time acts short of war do not always demand
a punitive response even if, as in the case of a
thoroughgoing outlaw regime, such a response
might be readily justified. After all, the real
accomplishment-and what is really at stake-is
the stability and therefore the persistence of the
overall framework of peaceful relations that is
accepted by liberal and decent hierarchical states
and peoples. If states only intermittently depart
from liberal or decent hierarchical expectations,
sharply punitive responses may not be necessary.
If states are liberal or decent often enough,
and therefore deal with each other often enough
within the familiar terms of international law that
Rawls seeks to reinforce, international norms ought
to be sufficientlywell established to at least some-
times constrain momentarily systematic states, if
only for reasons of tactics. In any event, viola-
tions of international law will occur within a
context that also calls attention to the possibility
of conformity, for other states or in other circum-
stances." Interpretive charity also suggests that
states that are not ordinarily liberal or decent
need not, in every case, be treated as outlaws. We
might imagine a category ofintermittently liberal
or decent states. Sufficiently free-standing acts of
these states-when judged as meeting Rawlsian
tests-could be understood to contribute to the
reinforcement of international norms, and should
therefore trigger corresponding responses from
other states.
Adjusting the approach of TheLaw ofPeoplesin
this way highlights the contribution that Rawls
makes to our thinking about international law.
He presents something very much like an exis-
tence theorem. Given enough states that act often
enough as liberal or decent states, familiar norms
of international law will be observed often enough
to remain relevant in practice. This argument is
a notably parsimonious one. It supposes only ap-
12 See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF SociEn' 41-92 (1984).
propriate domestic constitutions: Rawls need not
posit any particular role for international agen-
cies. Institutions-even ones as encompassing as
the United Nations-figure simply as means of
expressing state understandings. Nongovernmen-
tal organizations seem to be beside the point. It
is not necessary, moreover, for international law
itself to undertake the sometimes difficult effort
of characterizing states as liberal or decent. 3
International principles are in their own terms
entirely general, and may be argued about and
put to use as such, even though their persistence
is a by-product of particular state arrangements.
The narrow substantive scope ofRawls's discus-
sion has drawn much criticism. 4 The restricted
domain of international lawjustified in The Law
ofPeoples, however, is not preemptive-need not,
as it were, occupy the field. I reach this conclu-
sion through a somewhat roundabout way. Rawls
leaves an obvious, provocative gap in his account.
Although he draws repeatedly on World War II
for illustrations, he largely ignores the Cold War.
In one respect, of course, itis easy to understand
why-a period in which two regimes tend to treat
each other as systematic opposites is not likely, it
would seem, to leave a history useful in elaborat-
ing a defense of international law premised on
the existence of numerous and independent lib-
eral or decent states. But the Cold War is also
often thought of (and remembered) in a rather
different way. The adversaries typically found-
and felt themselves under pressure to find-ways
to isolate or accommodate particular conflicts, to
anticipate and appreciate each other's reactions,
and to negotiate quid pro quos. The deterrent ef-
fect (for both sides) of nuclear weapons worked
very much like liberal or decent order-motivat-
ing both sides to work out modes of dealing
characterized by something very much like a
sense of reciprocity. 5 There was, moreover, an-
other relevant aspect of the Cold War. Opposition
drove both sides to articulate, repeatedly and at
considerable length and depth, critiques of each
other's systematic pretentions, as well as defenses
of each side's own claims. Sensitivity to critique
" Concerning this difficulty, see Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter, LawAmongLiberalStates: Liberallnternationalism and
theAct of State Doctrine, 92 COLUm. L. REv. 1907 (1992).
14 See, e.g., WILLLAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND
LEGALTHEORY69-75 (2000); seealsosources cited supra
note 3.
15 See, e.g.,Jonathan Schonsheck, Nuclear Stalemate: A
SuperiorEscapefrom theDilemmas ofDeterrence, 20 PHIL. &
PUB. Ar. 35 (1991); Abram Chayes, An Inquiry into the
Workings of Arms Control Agreements, 85 HARV. L. REV.
905 (1972).
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may have contributed to at least some changes
in domestic arrangements and international
conduct (school desegregation in the United
States supplies one well-known example)." In-
deed, liberal political theory itself-in its still-
current form-emerged in this "as against" set-
ting. For example, the extraordinary worldwide
reception of A Theory ofJustice was, I suspect, at
least in part a Cold War phenomenon. Rawls put
forward what was easy to read as a comprehen-
sive underpinning for (perhaps especiallyAmeri-
can-style) liberal political arrangements.
In The Law of Peoples and other recent work,
ironically, Raws assigns his own masterpiece an
only marginal role, precisely because of its sys-
tematic tendency. Nevertheless, within an inter-
national setting that does, by and large, square
with Rawls's assumptions in The Law of Peoples,
punctuated order-with its sometime departures
from liberal or decent courses of conduct-
remains a real possibility, or so I have suggested.
In those moments at least, liberal or decent poli-
tics may not be free from challenge; defenders
may not find it sufficient to catalog the deficien-
cies of systematic adversaries. The Cold War-
something very much like its ideological battle-
ground, anyway-would from time to time re-
appear in microcosm. Liberal assumptions could
once more-repeatedly, actually-require ex-
tended assertion and defense.
In these intervals of conflict, questions of inter-
national law, like questions of domestic law, would
become occasions for registry-sites for the asser-
tion of competing perspectives. Ajurisprudential
politics of this sort demands concrete illustra-
tions of abstract premises; it need not, insofar as
it is importantly demonstrative, sharply distin-
guish between local and global opportunities. It
might, therefore, readily encompass much of what
Rawls leaves out-all sorts of matters of economic,
environmental, and human concern-as well as
the design of institutions appropriate for address-
ing these concerns. (Legal debate, international
and domestic, would within this account look
much like what it often actually looks like.) Com-
posite argument of this sort would not ground
international legal order. But pursued success-
fully by partisans of liberal or decent premises, it
would reinforce the relevance of the presupposi-
tions that Rawls identifies as fixing that order.
PATRICK O. GUDRIDGE
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16 See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold
WarImperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988).
The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in
International Relations and International Law.
Edited by Michael Byers. Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xvi, 354.
Index. $80, £50, cloth; $22.95, £12.99, paper.
The past decade has seen a growing interest of
international lawyers in the study and practice of
international politics. While international law
practitioners have always been aware of the pol-
icy (and political) context of their work, legal
scholarship has not always so clearly reflected the
intimate relationship between law and politics.
The Role of Law in International Politics is self-con-
sciously exceptional in this respect. Michael Byers
of Duke University Law School has brought
together a diverse set of scholarly essays that ex-
amine various aspects of the law-politics nexus in
international relations.
The volume's title does not adequately pre-
pare the reader for the range of issues and con-
cerns covered in the essays, which touch upon
myriad themes relating to the changing envi-
ronment of international lawmaking and gover-
nance. Actors, processes, structures, and intellec-
tual agendas all come under scrutiny in this
eclectic volume. Key questions include: What are
the sites of international lawmaking in the cur-
rent milieu? What actors are empowered to take
part in the norm-making and law-creating pro-
cess? Most generally, how has international law
adapted to a changing global environment?
Be warned that this volume is not at all geared
toward providing a coherent response to these
questions. Rather, it takes on the less ambitious
but perhaps more stimulating task of presenting
a disparate set of perspectives that situate inter-
national law (and sometimes legal studies gener-
ally) in its broad social and political context. In
a very brief introduction that does little to dictate
directions or boundaries to the contributions,
Byers suggests that the volume's essays address
three major themes: first, the relationship be-
tween the disciplines of international law and
international relations; second, the role of state
and nonstate actors in the development and
application of international law; and third, the
character of international legal norms and rules,
and how these affect state behavior.
The first of these themes-how the disciplines
of international relations and international law
relate to one another-gets sparks flying in the
early chapters of the book. "Collaboration" be-
tween scholars of international relations and inter-
national law now has enough of a track record to
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